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COMMENTS

THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS FROM BOMBARDMENT BY AIRCRAFT: THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR.*
Silent leges inter arma.

Cicero, Pro Milone, IV, 10.

[E]xpediency goes with security, while justice and honor cannot be followed
without danger.

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, V, 17.

King Henry-God bless him-will have to say for reasons of state, that
he never meant this to happen; and there is going to be an awful row.
Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral.

T. S.

I. INTRODUCTION
There is no doubt that international law is still suffering from the
vagaries of weakness and the lack of an authoritative source. Such
immaturity signifies a situation where the jurisprudential question of
the sources of law is much more alive than in settled systems of national
law. The present world order is caught in the matrix of evolution.
Nowhere is the confusion of the matrix more apparent than in the laws
of warfare. The demands of morality, meta-legal processes, prophecy,
terror, jurisprudential theories swirl about in a maelstrom which is both
a diagnosis and a prognosis of the world in which we live.
The problem of the international law of war, especially as restricted
to the bombardment of civilian populations and cities, is not subject
to positive law in the ordinary sense because the minimums of authority
and consent for such a law do not exist. Nevertheless, it is assumed
that there is a recognition of at least the need for such a law. To assume
otherwise is to leave thought in chaos. It is also assumed that disobedience to the international law which we do have has nothing to
do with the need for specification and implementation.
There is another broader assumption, that the limitation of warfare
must be based as much on the recognition of the need for rational policy
as upon the existence of international law, strictly so-called. The individual nations which have the capacity to subject other peoples to
attack by weapons of mass destruction must also realize that they have
a responsibility for other peoples as well.
*The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of The Judge Advocate General's School or any other

governmental agency.
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The determination of war policy cannot be made during the heat of
war. The man on horseback then has fully the advantage of action
over thought. During World War II, the Lord Bishop of Chichester
complained of British bombing policy:
I have recalled the joint declaration and these pronouncements because it is
so easy in the process of a long and exhausting war to forget that they were
once held without question to imply, and because it is a common experience
in the history of warfare that not only war but actions taken in war as military
necessities are often supported at the time by a class of arguments which, after
the war is over, people find are arguments to which they never should have
listened. 1

Viscount Trenchard, in saying that Chichester's sincerity was not
enough, appealed to the sincerity of those who were getting killed in
carrying out the policy:
Think of the feeling of the young men who go out on these great bombing battles
day after day and night after night.2

Behind this exchange in the House of Lords lay years of policy struggle
and an indistinct body of international law. That struggle and that
law will be explored in this article.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULES
During the era of limited warfare, limited at least to the less sophisticated minds of a more civilized century, attempts were made to restrict
warfare. Some of the rules and principles then laid down have been
used by analogy to apply to later weapons.
In 1868 the Declaration of St. Petersburg stated "That the only
legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish during
war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy." 3
In 1899, when balloons were still ineffective, the Contracting Powers
at the first Hague Conference agreed to prohibit for five years the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons or by other methods of
a similar nature. A renewal of the prohibition was agreed to in 1907,
again for a limited time, but without the former unanimity. 4
The Annex to the Hague Convention on Land Warfare of 1899 did
state in Article 25:
The attack or bombardment of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which
are undefended is prohibited.

1 130 H.L. DEB. (5th ser.) 739 (1944).
2

Id. at 832.

3 See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, DRAFT RULES FOR TIlE LIMITATION OF TIHE

144-45 (1966)
[hereafter cited as DRAfr RULES].
4 Lin, Aeronautical Law in the Time of War, 3 J. AIR L. & COM. 79, 82-83 (1932).
DANGERS INCURRED BY THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN TIME OF WAR
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Unfortunately, the restriction on bombardment of undefended towns
meant that the regulations was tied in with the rationale of siege bombardment because it has always been unlawful to attack a town which
is open to occupation anyway. The rule is reminiscent of later rules
forbidding terror bombing.
In 1907, Article 22 of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land was adopted. It gave one general applicable
principle:
The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.5

Because of the failure to develop air rules in 1907, the Russians proposed an amendment to Article 25 of the Laws and Customs of Land
Warfare. Italy also offered an amendment. As a result, the following
was adopted:
The attack or bombardment, by whaterer means, of towns, villages, dwellings,
or buildings which are undefended is prohibited.6

The 1907 rules on bombardment by naval forces were similar. Article
1 stated that "The bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports,
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden." However, Article
2 gives an exception:
Military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war
materid, workshops or plants which could be utilized for the needs of the hostile
fleet or army, and the ships of war in the harbor, are not, however, included in
this prohibition....
[The commander] incurs no responsibility for any unavoidable damage
which may be caused by a bombardment under such circumstances.

Article 27 of the 1907 Regulations, devoted to sieges and bombardments, only demanded that the attacker take
.. all necessary steps ... to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to
religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic mnonumnents, hospitals and
places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being
used at the time for military purposes.8

It should be noted that this rule does not protect noncombatants because of the needs of the attacking force in the zone of combat.
At the Madrid Session of the Institute of International Law, held in
1911, M. Fauchille presented some articles on air warfare:
Art. 6. The bombardment by aircraft of towns, villages, habitations or buildings
which are not defended is forbidden.
The rules established by the Hague Conventions of 18th October, 1907, relative
to Sieges and Bombardments by Land or Naval Forces, are applicable to aerial
war.
5Printed in 2 Scorr, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1S99 AND 1907, at 387
(1909).
6 Printed in 2 id. at 652.
7
Printed in 2 id. at 439.
8 Printed in 2 id. at 389.
TAGO 7140-B
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These suggestions were rejected because of the complaint that they were
out of proportion to existing capacities for navigation. So the Conference
adopted this rule:
Aerial war is permitted, but only on the condition that it does not present for
the persons or property of the peaceable population greater dangers than land
or sea warfare. 9

World War I practices were limited in scope and did not see the full
development of the scope of air warfare because fortunately the war
ended before bombardment squadrons were developed in large numbers. 10
More important for future practice was the development of the theory of
the Independent Air Force. An Italian, General Douhet, devoted his
life successfully to the gospel of strategic bombing. He is worth quoting
in extenso:
The prevailing forms of social organization have given war a character of
national totality-that is, the entire population and all the resources of a nation
are sucked into the maw of war. And, since society is now definitely evolving
along this line, it is within the power of human foresight to see now that future
wars will be total in character and scope....
It is useless to delude ourselves. All the restrictions, all the international
agreements made during peacetime are fated to be swept away like dried leaves
on the winds of war. A man who is fighting a life-and-death fight-as all wars
are nowadays-has the right to use any means to keep his life. War means
cannot be classified as human and inhuman. War will always be inhuman ....
The purpose of war is to harm the enemy as much as possible; and all means
which contribute to this end will be employed, no matter what they are....
We dare not wait for the enemy to begin using the so-called inhuman weapons
banned by treaties before we feel justified in doing the same. . . . Owing to
extreme necessity, all contenders must use all means without hesitation, whether
or not they are forbidden by treaties, which after all are nothing but scraps of
paper compared to the tragedy which would follow.11
...

It was in this atmosphere after a great war in which aerial theory had
not been put into practice that a Commission of Jurists developed Rules
of Warfare for Aircraft at the Hague, rules which were never ratified.
The Commission was set up after the Washington Conference of 1922.
It was composed of representatives from the United States, the British
Empire, France, Japan, Italy and Holland. The rules they adopted
for bombardment filled in the lacunae of the Hague Peace Conference
rules stringently:
Article 22
Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorising the civilian population, of
destroying or damaging private property not of military character, or of injuring
noncombatants is prohibited.
9 Printed in Lin, supra note 4, at 81.
10
SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 6-7 (3d ed. 1947).
"1DOUHET, THE COMMAND OF THE AIR 5-6, 181, 189 (Ferrari transl. 1942).
TACO 7140-B
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Article 24
(1) Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when directed at a military objective, that is to say, an object of which the destruction or injury would constitute a distinct military advantage to the belligerent.
(2) Such bombardment is legitimate only when directed exclusively at the
following objectives: military forces; military works; military establishments or
depots; factories constituting important and well-known centers engaged in
the manufacture of arms, ammunition or distinctively military supplies; lines
of communication or transportation used for military purposes.
(3) The bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings not
in the immediate neighborhood of the operations of land forces is prohibited.
In cases where the objectives specified in paragraph 2 are so situated, that
they cannot be bombarded without the indiscriminate bombardment of the
civilian population, the aircraft must abstain from bombardment.
(4) In the immediate neighborhood of the operations of land forces, the
bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings is legitimate
provided that there exists a reasonable presumption that the military concentration is sufficiently important to justify such bombardment, having regard
to the danger thus caused to the civilian population. 2
The proposals of the United States Secretary of War prior to the
meeting of the commission of Jurists had been much more specific but
nevertheless both he and the Secretary of the Navy approved these
provisions. The Secretary of the Navy went further in saying that the
draft would have a value for guidance whether it became a treaty or
not. 13 Although it was reported that the rules were to be submitted to
the Senate, the draft was quietly shelved. 14
The Disarmament Conference of 1932 tried to deal with the problem
again. The Benes Resolution of July 1932 agreed on a prohibition
against air attack on civilian populations. British proposals in 1933
floundered when Britain sought to eliminate the bomber and aerial
bombardment "save for police purposes in certain outlying regions." Is
During the debate over the bombing of Gernika, Mr. Eden, the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated in the House of Commons
that there was only one rule of international law regarding the bombing
of civilians, "that direct, deliberate and intentional bombing of noncombatants, as such, is illegal." 16 However, on 21 June 1938, the
Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, expanded this test:
I think we may say that there are, at any rate, three rules of international law
or three principles of international law which are as applicable to warfare from the
air as they are to war at sea or on land. In the first place, it is against international law to bomb civilians as such and to make deliberate attacks upon
civilian populations. That is undoubtedly a violation of international law.
[1923] 1 FoREIoN MEL. U.S. 77 (1938). Section 5 is omitted.
Letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State, 19 May 1923,
in id. at 87-89.
14 N.Y. Times, 23 June 1923, p. 1, col. 6.
15
SPAIGr, op. cit. Supra note 10, at 247.
16 331 H.C. DEB. (5th ser.) 339 (1938).
12

13
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In the second place, targets which are aimed at from the air must be legitimate
military objectives and must be capable of identification. In the third place,
reasonable care must be taken in attacking these military objectives so that by
1
carelessness a civilian population in the neighborhood is not bombed. "

Broad as Mr. Chamberlain's rules are, they bear the same phraseology
as the resolution and recommendation of the report of the Third Committee of the League of Nations of 30 September 1938:
(1) The international (sic) bombing of civilian populations is illegal;
(2) Objectives aimed at from the air must be legitimate military objectives
and must be identifiable;
(3) Any attack on legitimate military objectives must be carried out in such
a way that civilian populations in the neighborhood are not bombed
through negligence.' 8

III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRE-WORLD WAR II POLICY
The burden of the development of bombardment policy after World
War I lay with Great Britain. She developed a separate air arm and a
separate Bomber Command within that arm. Psychologically, Britain
wanted to eliminate as a possibility the terrible losses of land warfare that
decimated her armies in World War I. This was to be a return to the
tradition of reliance on a special arm similar to the old combination of
the Royal Navy, a small professional army and the land forces of the
allies. 19
In 1923 at a conference held by the Chief of the Air Staff, it was said:
The question had been asked at Camberley "Why is it that your policy of attack
from the air is so different from the policy of the Army, whose policy it is to
attack the enemy's army, while yours is to attack the civil population." The
answer was that we were able to do this while the Army were not, and so go
straight to the source of supply and stop it. Instead of attacking a machine
with 10 bombs we would go straight to the source of supply of the bombs and
demolish it, and the same with the source of production of the machine....
[Tlhe Army policy was to defeat the enemy Army-ours to defeat the enemy
nation. The Army only defeated the enemy Army because they could not
20
get at the enemy nation.

The attitude of Douhet was deep in those who headed the British air
arm. But there was a difficulty in convincing others. The problem
of aerial bombardment was extensively discussed in 1928. Trenchard,
the Chief of Air Staff, drew up a memo in which he said:
As regards the question of legality, no authority would contend that it is unlawful to bomb military objectives, wherever situated. There is no written
17337 id. at 937.
18 DRAr RULES 149.

19 See Cate, Plans,Policies, and Organization,in I THE ARMY Ain FORCES
WAR II 557, 592 (Craven & Cate eds. 1948).
20 4 WEBSTER & FRANKLAND,

IN

WORLD

THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY

62 (1961).
TACO 7140-B
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international law as yet upon this subject, but the legality of such operation.
was admitted by the Commission of Jurists who drew up a draft code of rule.
for air warfare at The Hague in 1922-23. Although the code then drawn up
has not been officially adopted it is likely to represent the practice which will
be regarded as lawful in any future war. Among military objectives must he
included the factories in which war material (including aircraft) is made, the
depots in which it is stored, the railway termini and the docks at which it is
loaded or troops entrain or embark, and in general the means of communication
and transportation of military personnel and material. Such objectives may
be situated in centers of population in which their destruction from the air will
result in casualties also to the reighboring civilian population, in the eame way
as the long-range bombardment of a defended coastal town by a naval force
results also in the incidental destruction of civilian life and property. The
fact that air attack may have that result is no reason for regarding the bombing
as illegitimate provided that all reasonable care is taken to confine the scope
of the bombing to the military objective. Otherwise a belligerent would be able
to secure complete immunity for his war manufactures and depots merely by
locating them in a large city. . . . What is illegitimate, as being contrary to
the dictates of humanity, is the indiscriminate bombing of a city for the sole
2
purpose of terrorising the civilian population.

Iilne, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff blasted Trenchard's
arguments as leading to an advocacy of indiscriminate bombing of
undefended towns and of their unarmed inhabitants. He drew attention
to another section of the Hague rules:
I feel compelled to draw attention to the fact that, in quoting the opinion
of the Commission of Jurists on this subject, the Chief of the Air Staff seems to
have overlooked an important qualification which was entered by this Body when
defining the legality of air operations against factories situated away from the
fighting areas. Their report states in Article 24, paragraph (3), that, where
such objectives cannot be bombarded without the indiscriminate bombardment
of the civilian population, aircraft must abstain from bombardment.=

Milne based his main arguments on expedience:
Whatever views may be held as to the ethical or moral rights of the ease, the
point of real importance to this Empire, and about which there should be no
doubt, is the practical aspect; in effect is such a policy expedient?22

The catalyst of expediency led to a confusion of desirable and ethical
military ends. The Western Air Plans of 1937 were drawn up for various
eventualities. W.A. 5 was the direct offensive on German industry in
the Ruhr.24 Although attacks on such industry would be legitimate:
There was another reason for which it was doubtful whether such a plan as
W.A. 5 could be put into operation. In view of the British air inferiority it is
not surprising to find that the possibility of restricting bombing to purely military
objectives now received fresh and sympathetic consideration. Such restriction
21

22
2

Id. at 73.
Id. at 78.

3 Id. at 79.
24 1 id. at 94--95, 97.
TAGO 7140-B
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had indeed always been part of official policy if the means could be found to
make it effective. On 21st June 1938 the Prime Minister announced in the
House of Commons that Britain would only bomb purely military objectives
and even so would take due care to avoid civilian casualties.... Both the Air
Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command, and the Air Ministry were
of opinion that restrictions on bombing would be an advantage and official
riders were sent to the former to confine25 his attacks to the .. plans which were
obviously aimed at military objectives.

It appears that the British felt that there were some sanctions in
international law but wanted these sanctions to be more than strictly
kept in order to protect themselves. This is what led to the confusion
of thought which is well projected in the British history:
Part of the argument centered upon the difference between "military" and
"civilian" targets and developed somewhat along the lines of the conventions
which had been attached to military and naval warfare. There was a school
of thought which demanded that bombing should be restricted to "military
targets" which could be destroyed without undue risk to "civilian" life or
property....
Obviously a strict interpretation of these obscure questions meant the absolute
prohibition of all strategic bombing and the confinement of all operations to
the actual area of ...fighting. It meant, indeed, the kind of restriction which
was, in fact, applied to Bomber Command at the outset of the Second World
War. On the other hand, once it had been agreed that this restriction was too
narrow-once it had been decided to extend the definition of "military targets"then the limit was very difficult to see. In modern war between major powers
there is, after all, practically nothing worth attacking which does not have some
bearing upon the national war effort. Even the national churches pray for
national victory....
Thus, the moral argument about strategic bombing, once that kind of warfare
had been accepted at all, tended to degenerate into the drawing of distinctions
between necessary and unnecessary destruction. But at this point it merged
with and became indistinguishable from the strategic argument, for clearly
it was against every strategic precept to waste bombs, bombers and bomb
crews .. .

It should be pointed out that although the United States advocated a
policy of bombardment of selected key spots in enemy industry (at least
in Europe), the Army Air Forces did not reject the concept of bombing
of enemy cities as such:
to crack should the AAF
Only when the industrial fabric of Germany began
27
turn to area bombing of cities for morale purposes.

This quote is taken from Air War Plans Division 1 of 11 September 1941,
a portion of a Joint Board Estimate of United States Over-All Production
25

Id.at 99.
at 14-15.
27Cate, supra note 19, at 599.

26Id.

TAGO 7140-3
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Requirements. Policy makers in the United States had failed to integrate what international law there was into policy, just as the British
had. 28
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY DURING
AND AFTER WORLD WAR II
The ingredients of international law and national policy were put into
the crucible of war from 1939 to 1945 and were found wanting in the
protection of civilians from bombardment. Moreover, bombardment
was found wanting as an efficient weapon for achieving the ends of war,
in the way it was used.
The Germans used their air force at the beginning of the war mainly
for land battles, in connection with what was essentially siege bombardment.29 Hitler's Directives for the Conduct of the War attempted to
protect civilian populations in Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg and
the attack on Britain was to be aimed at Britain's economy. '-0 Directive
No. 13 stated that the attack on England "is to be opened with a devastating attack in reprisal for the English attacks against the Ruhr area" but
in accord with the principles of Directive No. 9 which limited the attacks
to the war economy. Directive No. 17 of 1 August 1940 stated that
Hitler reserved for himself "the decision on terror attacks as a means of
3
reprisal." 1
At any rate, the development of unlimited warfare and bombardment
from the air was the policy of the victorious powers, not of Germany,
whatever Germany was responsible for in Poland or at Rotterdam and
32
Coventry.
In line with the early policy of expediency in order to protect Britain
from bombing, the British refrained from attacks on German war industry. On 1 September 1939, President Roosevelt had asked that
civilian populations of unfortified cities be spared. The English and
French replied that they would bomb only military objectives in the
narrowest sense and Hitler did the same. But on 10 May 1940, the
British announced through the Foreign Office that the right was reserved
to take any action appropriate in the event of the bombing of civilian
populations.3
28 The author apologizes for not considering World War II development of policy by
the United States. Lack of time prevented consideration of primary sources. Apparent lack of open discussion by Air Force officials prevents consideration of the
secondary
sources.
29
See LIDDELL HART, DEFENSE OF THE WEsT 318 (1950); cf. SPEzLEn, L'FTZUEG

UND MENSCHLICHrEIT 247 (1956).
30 See 8 DEP'T STATE, DocumsNTs ON GERmAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1918-1945, at 316,

430,1 463 (1954).
3 See id. at 463; 9 id. at 427; 10 id. at 390.
3

2 See SPA1GHT, op. cit. supra note 10, at 39; LIDDELL HART, op. ci*. supra note 29,
at 316-17.
S3SPAGHTr, op. cit. supra note 10, at 265.
TAGO 7140-B
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The British historians have stated:
This policy of restricted bombing was, however, a matter of expedience as much
as of morality, for the performance of the Luftwaffe in Poland, where bombing
was often indiscriminate, was soon taken by some highly placed officers to free
Britain from the moral obligation assumed by the acceptance of the Roosevelt
appeal. . . . Though as Air Commodore Slessor said, "Indiscriminate attack
on civilian populations as such will never form part of our policy," he felt that
3
it would be legitimate to attack the Ruhr power stations and oil plants. 1

But the British had to change their policy:
The conditions of limited warfare were, however, sufficiently violent to reveal
one fundamental operational fact. This was that Bomber Command could not
carry out a strategic offensive in daylight. Between September 1939 and the
launching of the offensive in May, 1940, the force, therefore, turned to night
action. . . . By November 1942, however, the process was almost complete
and bombing policy had progressed through a series of less and less precise aims
to that of general area attack on whole towns.
...the change in bombing policy was not due solely to the recognition of operational facts, though these alone did make it inevitable. It was also due to a
positive eagerness, shared by prominent members of the War Cabinet, that the
35
Germans should get as good as they were giving.

The British did at times return with their bombs early in the war because
they could not find their targets. The practice changed after the indiscriminate attack on London on 7 September 1940, although the
British claimed that military targets were still aimed at. 36
On 24 August, London central had been attacked for the first time.
On the first night after this attack, Bomber Command attacked Berlin
but not against the policy of precision bombing. 37 Paradoxically, it
is possible that the German shift of attack from the sector stations to
London in September as reprisal for the "reprisal" raid of 25 August
was a factor which saved the United Kingdom. As a matter of fact,
38
the first raid on London was an accident.
The problem of who started what in bombing civilians is necessarily
unclear since the Germans had the same operational difficulties as the
British. Certainly, even the reprisals were not really reprisals. At
least both sides claimed that their "reprisals" were really aimed at
military targets.
As early as September 1940, Bomber Command under Sir Charles
Portal believed that the by-product of hitting civilians should become
an end-product. The Vice-Chief of Air Staff, Sir Richard Peirse,
"believed that what was inevitable was also desirable only in so far
341 WEBSTER & FRANKLAND, op. Cit. supra note 20, at 135, quoting Plans Memo of
7 Sept 1936.
35Id. at 130.
36 SPAIGHT,

op. cit. supra note 10, at 268-69.

37 Id. at 53-54; 1 WEBSTER & FRANKLAND, op. cit. supra note 20, at 152.
38 COLLIER, THE DEFENcE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 233-34 (1957).

TAGO 7140-B
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as it remained a by-product of the primary intention to hit a military
target in the sense of a power station ....
9
The search for policy now became highly complex, without any real
guidelines other than those of maximum destruction while looking for
something better. It was pointed out by the Minister for Air, Sir
Archibald Sinclair, on 16 June 1941, that the program for obliteration
bombing was too heavy for industry to bear, intimating a desire to
try day bombing again. 40 Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, made the same remark on 2 June 1941, stating that the attack on
morale took large forces so that transport should be the primary target
with morale as primary when bomber forces were large enough.41
What ensued was that communications and morale became twin
target systems and the Director of Bombing Operations had already
placed them together on 13 May 1941, because communications targets
were adjacent to workers' dwellings and congested areas of industry. 42
Lord Trenchard's argument on 19 May 1941 was this:
... if you are bombing a target at sea, then 99 per cent of your bombs are wasted,
but not only 99 per cent of your bombs are wasted but pilots (etc.). So, too, if
the bombs are dropped in Norway, Holland, Belgium or France, 99 per cent.
do Germany no harm, but do kill our old allies, or damage their property or
frighten them or dislocate their lives.... If, however, our bombs are dropped
in Germany, then 99 per cent. which miss the military target all help to kill,
damage, frighten or interfere with Germans in Germany and the whole 100 per
cent. of the bomber organization is doing useful work, and not merely 1 per
cent. of it. 43

Morale was defined only at the end of 1941 because of United States
insistence and criticism. The attack on morale included
"the disruption of transportation, living and industrial facilities of the German
population rather than the more restricted meaning." This definition implied
that the attack was directed not so much to destroying the German worker's
will to work as to deprive him of the means of working effectively. This distinction became more apparent in later stages of area bombing. It is obviously
different [it is indeed not] from that put forward by Lord Trenchard and others
who had supported the attack on morale earlier in 1941."4

On 14 February 1942, Air Vice-Marshal Bottomley wrote to the Acting
Chief of the Bomber Command:
In accordance with these principles and conditions, a review has been made of
the directions given to you in Air Ministry letter dated 9.7.41, and it has been
decided that the primary objective of your operations should now be foc"eon the morale of the enemy civil population and in particular, of the industrial
5
workers.'
39 1 WEBsTER & FRANKLAND, op. cit. supra note 20, at 154.
40 See id. at 177.
41 See 4 id. at 198-99.
2

4

See 1 id. at 297; 4 id. at 136.

43 4 id. at 195.
'4
45

1 id. at 298.
4 id. at 144.

The bracketed comment is mine.

TAGO 7140-B
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Portal in a minute to Bottomley specifically said:
I suppose it is clear that the aiming points are to be the built-up areas, not, for
instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories .... 46

To keep its place in the war, the strategic air offensive had to show
results. This led to the 1,000 bomber raid on Cologne of 30 May
47
1942, the first of the great raids.
It had been claimed, even during the war, that the attack on morale,
even as the broader definition would have it, was a waste. The broader
definition solved United States criticism by including legitimate targets
within its ambiguous words.
More practical uses for bombers were suggested until such time as
operational difficulties were solved. There was a fight to have aircraft
transferred to Coastal Command 48 which was stoutly resisted by Air
Marshal Harris who said it took some 7,000 hours of flying to destroy
one submarine at sea while this was enough to destroy one-third of
Cologne in one night.49 Blackett put the emphasis positively, away
from mere destruction, saying each bomber could save at least six
merchant ships in 30 sorties while in bombing Berlin it could drop less
than 100 tons of bombs and kill not more than a couple of dozen enemy
50
men, women, and children and destroy a number of houses.
The bombing of French targets in 1942 led to much criticism because
of the damage done to French civilians. The resulting directive of 29
October 1942 showed that operational considerations did not have to
be the paramount considerations in bombardment:
It was in an effort to bring up to date a code of rules for operations in this
delicate but unavoidable situation that the Air Ministry, to whom the responsibility for such political matters was customarily left, issued the directive of
October 29. Bombardment was to be confined to military objectives. The
intentional bombardment of civilian populations, as such, was forbidden. It
must be possible to identify the objective. The attack must be made with
reasonable care to avoid undue loss of civilian life in the vicinity of the target,
and if any doubt existed as to the possibility of accurate bombing or if a large
error would involve the risk of serious damage to a populated area no attack was
to be made. The provisions of Red Cross conventions were, of course, to be
observed. Military objectives were defined broadly to include any sort of
industrial, power, or transportation facility essential to military activity. ...
In conclusion, the directive stressed that none of the foregoing rules should apply
in the conduct of air warfare against German, Italian, or Japanese territory,
except that the provisions of Red Cross conventions were still to be observed,
for consequent upon the enemy's adoption of a campaign of unrestricted warfare,
46 1

id. at 322-24.

47 Id. at 339, 342.
48

Blackett, OperationalResearch, in [1953] BRAssEY's ANNUAL 88, 103-04 (Thursfield

ed.).
49 1 WEBSTER & FRANKLAND, op.
50

cit. supra note 20, at 342.

Blackett, supra note 48, at 104.
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the Cabinet have authorized a bombing policy which includes the attack on
enemy morale. 51

Further problems arose to plague the independent air force concept.
Air Marshal Harris had depended primarily on destruction of everything to carry out Bomber Command's mission. In Coventry, 100 out
of 1,922 acres had been destroyed. But in Hamburg, 6,200 out of
8,382 acres were destroyed; in Essen 1,030 out of 2,630.52 Yet the
German Air Force was not dead by the end of 1943, and the approach
of Overlord made it imperative that the Allies gain air superiority.
And even the American Eighth Air Force policy of precision bombing
was failing because of a lack of air support while the British casualties
53
on night raids were also mounting.
The British historians have commented on the dilemma:
It might appear, and it has often been suggested, that a great moral issue
was involved in this situation, but the moral issue was not really an operative
factor. The choice between precision and area bombing was not conditioned
by abstract theories of right and wrong, nor by interpretations of international
law. It was ruled by operational possibilities and strategic intentions.54

Reduced to plain English, this means that policy was being made up on
a day-to-day basis, ignoring any moral factor and failing to establish
sound military policy besides. The authors go on to draw a distinction
without a difference:
The issue did not concern simply the operational distinction between day
precision and night area bombing, though that was to some extent involved. It
arose from the strategic difference between selective and general attack. Selective
bombing was based upon the principle that "it is better to cause a high degree
of destruction in a few really essential industries than to cause a small degree
of destruction in many industries." It could be pursued by precision bombing,
which would strike at individual factories and plants in the particular key industries which had been selected, and by area bombing, which would strike at
particular towns associated with those industries. The principle of general
attack . . . postulated the theory that the only effective attack as that which,
by cumulative results, produced such a general degree of devastation in all the
major towns that organized industrial activity would cease owing to a combination of material and moral effects.5

At any rate, the British started to get qualms about night area attacks
and in the beginning of 1944 had to shift over to at least selective attack. 56 It was admitted:
This emphasis upon the value of selective attack corresponded more closely
to the aim which had inspired the efforts of the Eighth Air Force than to the
51A. Ferguson, Oriins of the Combined Bomber Offen.ire, in 2 TiE A- my AIR
FORCES IN WORLD WAR II 209, 210 (1949).
52 2 WEBSTER & FRANKLAND, op. cit. supra note 20, at 48.
5 Id. at 37-39.
54 Id. at 22.
5 Id. at 5.
5

6 Id. at4-6.
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policy which had generally and primarily governed the conduct of Bomber
Command since the summer of 1941. Yet it was undoubtedly the apparent
failure of the Eighth Air Force, culminating in the Schweinfurt disaster of October
1943, which had produced this shift. The continuing growth of the German
fighter force and the evident failure of the Eighth Air Force to check it coupled
with the approach of Overlord and the overwhelming need for air superiority,
had virtually forced the Air Staff into what amounted to a policy of desperation .... The general area assault... appeared to be not only extravagant but
57
also irrelevant.

The Casablanca directive which had been sent to Sir Arthur Harris
on 4 February 1943 was ambiguous in its policy. Harris changed some
words and introduced the new version as a direct quote in order to
make morale the supreme objective of the Combined Bomber Offensive. 58
This duplicity in the making of policy was matched on the public level:
The conduct of the strategic air offensive had long been regarded with suspicion
by sections of public opinion in Britain. It was generally regarded as morally
legitimate to bomb strategic objectives such as factories, oil plants . . . even if
this did incidentally cause severe destruction of residential areas and of civilian
life and limb. On the other hand, the view that it was morally legitimate to
bomb residential areas, even if the object was to reduce military or industrial
activity, was frequently challenged, and the more apparent it became that in
the majority of the major area attacks, Bomber Command was, in fact, aiming
at the centres of the residential areas, the more pronounced the protests became.
Nevertheless, the view that the Air Staff ... were ultimately responsible for
the decision to carry out... "terror bombing" had grown up with.., the bombing
offensive. This was undoubtedly at least partly attributable to the nature of
the frequent public and in some cases private pronouncements which Sir
Archibald Sinclair found it his duty to make. In these he did not concede that
one of the objects of area bombing was the reduction of civilian and especially
industrial morale by the bombing of housing and public utilities and so, of course,
of the populations themselves. He usually, and, on public occasions, invariably,
suggested that Bomber Command was aiming at military or industrial installations as, of course, it sometimes was.59

For example, the Secretary of State for Air said at various times:
The objects of our bombing offensive in Germany are to destroy the capacity
of Germany to make war and to relieve the pressure of the German Air Force
and Armies on our Russian allies. No instruction has been given to destroy
dwelling houses rather than assault factories, but it is impossible to distinguish
in night bombing between the factories and dwellings which surround them.6 0

On 3 November 1943, the question was put to him:
In view of the fact that our bombing is discriminatory and that we seek only
industrial targets, whereas the German bombers over this country go for civilian
targets in a large percentage of cases, do not these figures afford further proof
57

Id. at 71.

S Id. at 14.

59 3 id. at 114.
60379 H.C. DEB. (5th ser.) 1364 (1943); cf. 388 H.C.
395 H.C. DEB. (5th ser.) 337-38 (1943).

DEB.

(5th ser.) 155 (1943);
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of the desirability of concentrating our heavy bombers and those of the United
States here on destroying the war production of the enemy? 61

Sinclair replied ambiguously that "certainly all our bombing attacks
are directed to the destruction and dislocation of the German war
machine."
Amazingly, after the conquest of the German Air Force which had
been necessary for D-Day, the renewal of the Battle of Berlin was
projected in July of 1944 not as against industry but as against morale.
There was one suggestion to obliterate towns of 20,000 population but
this was said to effect too small a portion of Germany. The policy did
lead to the attack on Dresden in February 1945, the climax of the night
area offensive.6 2 After the attack, the public outcry was so great that
on 28 March 1945, the Prime Minister addressed a minute to General
Ismay and the Chief of the Air Staff:
The destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of
Allied bombing. I am of the opinion that military objectives must henceforward
be more strictly studied in our own interests than that of the enemy.
The Foreign Secretary has spoken to me on this subject, and I feel the need
for more precise concentration upon military objectives, such as oil and communications behind the immediate battle-zone, rather than on mere acts of
terror and wanton destruction, however impressive.63

Due to pressure from the Air Staff, Churchill withdrew the minute and
reissued it on 1 April 1945, specifying only that methods be "reviewed
from the point of view of our own interests." 64
On the other side of the world, the experts were slow to authorize
area techniques in Japan. But the temptation was too great. Where
15 leading RAF area targets in Germany had contained only about
12.3 percent of greater Germany's total labor force, 14 leading Japanese
urban areas contained 42.5 percent. Industry was more centralized
as well, i.e., 40 percent of aircraft engine production was located in
65
one city.
On 9-10 March 1945, 16 square miles of Tokyo were set ablaze with
78,000 Japanese killed. As one author phrased it:
With such obliteration of cities as accepted mode of warfare on both sides, it
was difficult for most military chieftains to believe that a new weapon of destruction presented ethical questions not found in TNT and the fire bomb.P

The ground had been well prepared for the use of the atomic bomb.
There was a consistent recognition of some standard to be followed in
61 393 id. at 641.
62

See 3 WEBsTER & FRANKLAND, op. cit. supra note 20, at 52-55, 103-09.
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Id. at 112.

6Id.
65

66

at 117.

THE AAF AGAINST JAPAN 451 (1948).
KNEBEL & BAILEY, No HIGH GROUND 98-99 (1960).
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bombardment of cities, sometimes recognized as quite stringent. Nevertheless, the appeal to the undoubted crimes of the enemy led to so-called
reprisals by Great Britain and the United States and then to an area
bombing policy which was a real concession to the attitude that the end
justifies the means.
Unfortunately, the means were ill-adapted to the avowed pragmatic
purpose. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that
area bombing was ineffective to achieve its ends. 67 More amazingly,
the British Bombing Survey Unit agreed, although the British had
expended one-half their effort in area bombing:
On the evidence, they concluded that "area bombing against German cities could
not have been responsible for more than a very small part of the fall which
actually had occurred in German production by the spring of 1945, and . . . in
terms of bombing effort, they were also a very costly way of achieving the results
which they did achieve." 68

Reich Mlinister Speer on 1 December 1944 said:
You must realize that those people of the enemy who work out the plans for the
economic bombing attacks know German industry very well and that there is
here a clever and far-reaching planning in contrast to our earlier raids on England.
We have been lucky in that the enemy did not make methodical use of this detailed planning until the last half or three-quarters of this year and that before
69
that he gave us enough time.

Speer confirmed these observations in interrogations after the War.
To him, the night attacks against city centers were "incomprehensible"
because the effects on industry were slight. Even when attacks were
directed on industrial areas, and damaged to plants more widespread, the
damage was not enough for destruction. The effect of raids like Cologne
and Hamburg was primarily in their shock effect. But even Hamburg
70
recovered speedily.
In an interrogation on 18 July 1945, Speer went on to say:
In spite of all this, however, the Allied air attacks remained without decisive
success until early 1944. This failure, which is reflected in the armaments output figures of 1943 and 1944, is to be attributed principally to the tenacious
efforts of the German workers and factory managers and also to the haphazard
and too scattered form of attack of the enemy who until the attacks on the synthetic
oil plants based his raids on no clearly recognisable economic planning.
The American attacks, which followed a definite system of assault on industrial
targets, were by far the most dangerous. It was in fact these attacks which caused
the breakdown of the German armaments industry. The night attacks did not
71
succeed in breaking the will to work of the civilian population.
67 Quoted in 4 WEBSTER & FRANKLAND, op. cit. supra note 20, at 48.
68 Id. at 49.
69 Id. at 358.
70
Id. at 375.
71 Id. at 380, 383.
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V. THE DEVELOPMENTS OF RULES AFTER WORLD WAR II
After World War II, there has been little official development in the law
regarding bombardment of civilians. But there has been a strange
verification. At Nuremberg, it was stated by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe:
These last documents seem to raise quite clearly the issues of tu quoque: If the
Reich committed breaches of the laws and usages of war, other people did the
same thing. The submission of the Prosecution is that that is entirely irrelevant.
The standard is laid down by the conventions and it is no answer, even if it
were true that someone else had committed breaches .... "2

And Mr. Justice Jackson said somewhat the same:
If Your Honor please, I believe it is a well-established principle of international
law that a violation on one side does not excuse or warrant violations on the
other side. There is, of course, a doctrine of reprisal, but it is clearly not applicable here, on any basis that has been shown.73

In the Hostages Trial, the Tribunal concluded that the "rules of international law must be followed even if it results in the loss of a battle or
even a war." 74
Despite all the inhibitions on air warfare pointed out above and
despite the resounding principles of the Nuremberg trials, air warfare
had been used by the victorious Allies to an almost unlimited extent.
Schwarzenberger has pointed out:
It is significant that, in the British directive [of 29 October 19421, the bombing
policy adopted is not justified on the ground of reprisals, but based merely on a
tu quoque argument. It is even more relevant that neither the Indictment
leading to the trials of the German major war criminals before the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg nor the Judgment itself deals expresly with
the question of the legality of German air warfare or the most indiscriminate of
all known forms of warfare, that is to say, the German V-weapons .... 75

Whatever rules had exercised an inhibiting effect on the policy makers
were highly confused to have allowed the situation to come to this pass.
Atomic weaponry has made specification of inhibiting factories even more
difficult. Army Field Manual 27-10 of July 1956 has already laid down
the applicable lack of law:
The use of explosive "atomic weapons" whether by air, sea or land forces,
cannot as such be regarded as violative of international law in the absence of
any customary rule of international law or international convention restricting
their employment.
There is no prohibition of general application against bombardment from
the air of combatant troops, defended places, or other legitimate objectives.".
72 8 INT'L MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

178-79 (1947).

id. at 188.
74
Quoted in SINGH,
73 9

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 212 (1959).
SCHWARZENBERGER, TuE LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 20-21 (1958).
7
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Interestingly enough, Article 25 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare
is specified in the Army Field Manual by an explanation relating to
the naval rules:
Factories producing munitions and military supplies, military camps, warehouses storing munitions and military supplies, ports and railroads being used
for the transportation of military supplies, and other places devoted to the
support of military operations or the accommodation of troops may also be
attacked and bombarded even though they are not defended.
Particularly in the circumstances referred to in the preceding paragraph,
loss of life and damage to property must not be out of proportion to the military
77
advantage to be gained.

The United States Air Force apparently has published nothing on
the subject of the legal protection of civilians from bombardment.
78
Rather, the mission of strategic operations was broadly defined.
The International Committee of the Red Cross drew up draft rules
7 9 Six out of 10
which were submitted to the nations for consideration.
proposals to amend Article 14 relating to blind weapons were to prohibit
such weapons entirely. Even so, General Gruenther, representative of
the United States for the American Red Cross said that Articles 8, 9, 10
and 14 taken together "can be considered as virtually prohibiting the use
of atomic weapons in war." 80 Mr. Siordot, Vice President of the
International Committee of the Red Cross set the tone when he said:
The ICRC knows that in a conflict the preservation of a country's safety may
face it with harsh necessities .... On the other hand, its mission ... is to proclaim
81
and ceaselessly reaffirm the fact that humanity also has its necessities.

The rules were constructed on the idea that the Hague Rules, although
not completely modernized, expressed principles "which, in the absence
82
of any more suitable code of rules, are and remain valid at all times."

Finally, to bring one development down to 1963, the policy of counterforce is being enunciated in today's war councils. This policy is not law
but it is based on a fundamental need for rationalization in conflict.

Dr. Alain Enthoven, Assistant Secretary of Defense, has said:
In the nuclear age, military force will be too dangerous to use if our objectives
are not carefully chosen and limited at each step of a conflict, and if the force
cannot be used in a controlled and deliberate way to achieve precisely the objectives being sought. To fight for unlimited objectives, or to fight in an uncontrolled way would almost surely bring on almost unlimited destruction.
77Id. at 19.
78
79
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Moreover, when force is being applied, the military action must not be allowed
to control events and compel the President's decisions; rather, it should be the
other way around....
This belief may be contrasted to the view that "peace is peace and war is war,"
and in war military necessity is the only valid criterion for decision.. . . The
President must be free to weigh the requirements of the military, commander
against other requirements....
Doubtless questions will arise in your minds as to whether nuclear war can
and should be limited and controlled. First can it? The answer depends on our
will to make it so.8

VI. THE THEORIES
Men such as Liddell Hart and Walter Lippman have pointed out that
the modern democracies seem to be going the way of the Greeks. The
democratic system brakes preparations for war but once passions are
aroused, then no control exists. So it was that the theory of the Independent Air Force won out over the idea of precision bombing in
World War H1.84
One of the better authors on this subject has given almost a totally
pragmatic cast to his approach to the problem of the protection of
civilians:
The elements which form the basis of warfare rules fall into two main categories: a dominating group of military interests and a minor group growing out of
"social sanction." This dominating group of military interests is bound up
with state security and is motivated solely by utility. Its one standard is
effectiveness. Checks on this effectiveness never come from within the group.
The few restraints in force come from without from the common culture of the
time expressed as a social sanction.8 5

Although the prediction was made before World War II that one of
the main agencies of war would be poison gas,SG the social sanction, or
the fear of reprisal, stopped the use of gas. There is a ferment today,
even apart from the Ban the Bombers, which may lead to the avoidance of
planned use of nuclear bombs on cities-the needs for tactical weapons
against armies,87 the realization that exaggerated nationalism feeds the
immoral use of technology, 88 the prophetic voices of religious leaders.89
83 Address by Asst. Sec. of Defense Alain C. Enthoven, before the Loyola University
Forum for National Affairs, Los Angeles, Calif., 10 Feb. 1963.
84 See LIPPMAN, ESSAYS IN THE PUBLIC PHILosoPitY 23-24 (1955); LIDDELL HART,
op. cit. supra note 29, at 319-20; A. ARmSTRONG, UNCONDrrMONAL SURRENDER 163-64
(1961).
85 RoYsE, AERIAL BOMBARDMENT 1 (1928).
86 See Quindry, Aerial Bombardment of Civilian and Military Objecdires, 2 J. AIR L.
& CoM. 474 (1931).
87 See Moriarity, Technology, Strategy and National M ilitary Policy, in MORALITY
AND MODERN WARFARE 34, 53-54 (Nagle ed. 1960).
88 See T. Murray, Morality and Security: The Forgotten Equation, in id. at 58, 59;
Mumford, The Morals of Extermination, in BREAKTHROUGH TO PE.ACE 17-18 (New
Directions paperback 1962).
89 Merton, Peace: A Religious Responsibility, in BREAKTHROUGH TO PEACE 103 (New
Directions paperback 1962).
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The basic problem for international law has been well posed by Walter
Stein:
In the normal run of the world, force is a right and necessary condition of order
and humane existence. We cannot imagine a world that could not, man being
what he is, require a measure of physical power, to restrain abuses of physical
power ....

Yet it is precisely at this moment of extreme need for physical pro-

tection that effective physical force seems to elude us, beyond its ultimate tolerable
limits.90
In this context, the fight for international law takes substance.
Granted that the Hague Rules protecting undefended cities except for
military objectives have an old-fashioned cast, the rules did point the
way to certain solutions by way of certain principles. Even the 1923
Draft Rules were too tightly drawn but they did give adequate guidelines
which would have been better operational policy than that actually
followed in World War II. Royse with all the cynicism of his utilitarianism gives a more practical guide as to what must be done. The
policy makers for the military must set up the military posture in a
fashion which is directed against the military force of the enemy.
With competing world systems, morality cannot be written into law
because the structure cannot bear the strain. The principle of the
inviolability of noncombatants is still a principle but not one that
underlies the law of war. As one author has put it, the conceptual
basis for a law of nuclear war must be that of legitimate military necessity. 91 It would seem, however, that legitimate military necessity
could well be immoral unless reference is made to something outside of
the structure of international military law. Legitimate military necessity
would seem to take its reference from within the military system.
Legitimate military necessity has been defined as:
All measures immediately indispensable and proportionate to a legitimate
military end, not prohibited by the laws of war or by the natural law, taken
on the decision of a responsible commander subject to judicial review.92
This seems to be a circular definition because to appeal to the natural
law is to go back to the "humanitarianism" originally rejected by the
author.
During World War II, area bombing could well have been subject to
the laws of proportionality up to a point, since it could have been conceivably argued that there was no other way to attack German industry.
The argument would not have been valid because before D-Day direct
attacks were made on civilians and after D-Day, the area bombing
90
Stein, The Defense of the West, in BREAKTHROUGH TO PEACE 158 (New Directions
paperback 1962).
91W. O'Brien, Legitimate Military Necessity in Nuclear War, 2 WORLD POLITY
40-41 (1960).
92 W. O'Brien, The Meaning of Military Necessity in International Law, 1 WOnLD
POLITY 174-75 (1957).
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policy was continued although it was no longer needed to protect operational safety. The Germans stated that the heavy raids were most
dangerous because of their shock value when there was a sudden step-up
in activity. This was possibly the greatest effect of the atomic bombs;
they did help avert bloody land battles which would have killed many
more Japanese, let alone Americans, and would have left a path of
hate across Japan.93 Should both sides have the atomic bomb, the
argument of proportionality diminishes because there is a vast possibility
that the use of such weapons will have no rational connection with the
end of a war, only with the beginning.
Schwarzenberger has rejected the notion that there are any lawcreating processes, relevant legal principles or relevant individual rules
to control the use of atomic weapons, let alone ordinary bombs.9' He
comes to the conclusion that the protection of the enemy civilian population is limited to those who are not connected with the war effort. and are
remote from target areas. 95 It is likely that his conclusion is influenced
by a presupposition:
[T]he first, and most self-denying, duty of the international lawyer is to warn
against the dangerous illusion that his findings on the legality or illegality of
nuclear weapons are likely to influence one way or the other the decision on the
use of these devices of mechanised barbarism.
. . . He must be willing to consider without fear or favour any changes in the

structure of existing world society, however radical, which may be required
to break the vicious circle of our system of world power politics in disguise.%

It is submitted that a limited international law is today without
power to control war by laws of war, as is indicated by aerial bombing
of civilian populations. Schwarzenberger's conclusion can only lead to
the attempt to make it policy that there must be a world government with
a legal monopoly of force. Long range and idealistic as such an attempt
is, there is no other substitute but cold war.
PAUL J. GODA*

9s Cf. U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY, JAPAN'S STRUaLE TO END THE WAR 8,
12 (1946); cf. the revelations of Lt. Col. Masataka Iwata, Japan War Rerdalion,
San Jose Mercury, 14 Aug. 1965, p. 8, on the continuation of war if the atom bomb had
not been dropped.
94 See SCHWARZENBERGER, op. cit. supra note 75, at 7-11.
95 See id. at 22.
9 Id. at 58.
*Seminarian, Alma College, Los Gatos, California; B.S., 1952, Loyola University of
Log Angeles; A.B., 1956, Gonzaga University; LL.B., 193, Georgetown University
Law Center; member of the bar of the State of California.
TAGO 7140-B

HeinOnline -- 33 Mil. L. Rev. 113 1966

HeinOnline -- 33 Mil. L. Rev. 114 1966

